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PRICE ADJUSTMENT IN LONG-TERM CONTRACTS
VICTOR

P.

GOLDBERG*

Professor Goldberg provides a framework for analyzing price adjustment in
private contracts, arguing that long-term contracts result from businesses seeking the
benefits of cooperation, not avoiding risk as usually assumed. Professor Goldberg, an
economist, examines incentives for price adjustments in long-term contracts and the
variety of price adjustment methods available. He concludes by applying his
framework to Alcoa v. Essex.
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I. INTRODUCTION

After parties enter into a contract, changed circumstance might
result in one of them being dissatisfied with the price. Anticipating this,
the parties could include a price adjustment mechanism in the agreement. If the mechanism is imperfect, some dissatisfaction will remain.
This dissatisfaction may result in litigation with the dissatisfied party
asking the court either to excuse performance or revise the contract
*
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price. For example, large changes in fuel prices since 1973 generated
considerable litigation.'
In this paper, I suggest a framework for analyzing price adjustment in private contracts. Contrary to most economists and lawyers, I
argue that price adjustment problems have little to do with attitudes
toward risk. Rather, the problems are those suggested by the "relational exchange" approach to contracts. 2 This argument will be developed in Part II.
A court faced with a claim of changed circumstance must deal with
two questions. Is the change sufficient to justify relief, and, if so, what
relief should be granted? The court could void the contract and dis-

charge the obligation of the loser, revise the price term as German
courts often do,3 or recognize a duty to renegotiate in good faith, as
proposed by my colleague, Richard Speidel. 4
Contracting parties sometimes invite the courts to rewrite explicit
price terms by including open-ended language. Force majeure clauses,

for example, are boiler plate terms which discharge performance under
conditions that are not always clearly defined. More importantly, long-

term contracts sometimes provide for price adjustment to prevent a
1. See Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979); In re
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, No. 235 (E.D. Va. Oct. 27, 1978) (bench
opinion); and Missouri Public Service Co. v. Peabody Coal Co., 583 S.W.2d 721 (Mo. App.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 865 (1979). For a discussion of litigation of natural gas contracts, see also A
Stunning Challenge to the Sanctity of Contracts, Bus. WK., August 22, 1983, at 76-77.
2. See Goldberg, Relational Exchange: Economics and Complex Contracts, 23 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIsT 337 (1980); Macneil, Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under
Classical,Neoclassical,and RelationalContract Law, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 854 (1978); and Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of ContractualRelations, 22 J. LAW & ECON.
233 (1979).
3. See Dawson, Judicial Revision of Frustrated Contracts. Germany, 63 B.U.L. REv.
1039 (1983) [hereinafter cited as FrustratedContracts: Germany]; Dawson, Judicial Revision of
FrustratedContracts: The United States, 64 B.U.L. REV. 1 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Frustrated
Contracts: United States].
4.
Assume that after changes occur which upset the balance struck ex ante in a long-term
contract, the disadvantaged party initiates negotiations and ultimately proposes an adjustment in the price term. What should the advantaged party do? Under ... traditional
contract law, he may refuse to negotiate or adjust without legal consequences. No duties
are imposed upon the advantaged party in the ex post bargaining process. This result is,
in my judgment, unsound. At a minimum, the advantaged party should have a legal duty
to negotiate in good faith. At a maximum, he should have a legal duty to accept an
'equitable' adjustment proposed in good faith by the disadvantaged party. Breach of
these duties constitutes improper conduct in the ex post bargaining setting and justifies
appropriate judicial remedies, including a court-imposed price adjustment.
Speidel, Court-ImposedPrice Adjustments Under Long-Term Supply Contracts, 76 Nw. U.L. REv.
369, 404-05 (1981).

1985:527

Price Adjustments in Long-Term Contracts

"gross inequity", the-nature of which is left undefined. 5 The decisions
to discharge or adjust could be left to the courts or assigned to a party
other than the courts, an arbitrator, for example.
Part III focuses on Alcoa v. Essex-the only example of an American court revising the contract price in a long-term supply contract. 6 I
am interested in what the parties were trying to accomplish, why the
contract worked poorly, and the court's analysis of these issues. I am
not particularly concerned with whether the decision was correct, but
for what it is worth, in my opinion the court should not have revised the
contract.
Part IV considers general problems confronting courts or arbitrators resolving price adjustment disputes. Concluding remarks follow in
Part V.

II. THE

ECONOMICS OF PRICE ADJUSTMENT

Economists commonly invoke risk aversion in analyzing contracts.7 It is an "easy" explanation and it is tempting to end the search
5. Some gross inequity clauses Ihave seen have included a definition of what constitutes a gross inequity (for example, a contract price more than X0o away from a specified published price). However, others have been silent on this.
Gross inequity clauses are commonly used in long-term contracts. Of the 21 long-term coal
contracts analyzed by Paul Joskow, 13 included gross inequity clauses. Joskow, Vertical Integration and Long Term Contracts: The Case of Coal-Burning Electric Generating Plants I J. OF L.,
ECON., & ORG. 33 (1985). The typical duration of Joskow's contracts was 35 years. For an example
of a shorter coal contract (ten years) which included both an arbitration and gross inequity clause,
see Georgia Power Co. v. Cimarron Coal Corp., 526 F.2d 101 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied425 U.S.
952 (1976).
6. Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
the Alcoa opinion is a lonely monument on a bleak landscape, the only instance in which an
American judge has tried to dictate entirely different substantive terms (in this instance the price)
in a contract that was still being actively performed. This may explain why so much attention has
been given to the frustrated venture of a single trial judge whose fancy was unusually free." Frustrated Contracts: United States, supra note 3, at 35.
Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., Inc., 664 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1981), is arguably
another case in which the court revised the price term. However, in that case the revision was not
explicit but was couched in terms of interpreting the meaning of the price term, given that during
the life of the contract the parties had already modified the price in a manner apparently inconsistent with the contract language.
7. See A.M. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND EcoNoMics 57-63 (1983);
Harris & Raviv, Some Results on Incentive Contracts with Applications to Education and Employment, Health Insurance, and Law Enforcement, 68 AM. EcoN. REy. 20 (1978); Polinsky, Risk Sharing Through Breach of Contract Remedies, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 427 (1983); Perloff, The Effects of
Breaches of ForwardContractsDue to UnanticipatedPrice Changes, 10 J. LEGAL STUD.221 (1981);
Posner & Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrinesin ContractLaw: An Economic Analysis,
6 J.LEGAL STUD. 83 (1977).
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at that point.8 For example, in his analysis of the Westinghouse case,
Paul Joskow asked: "Why would somebody buy a long-term fixed price
contract other than to insure against fluctuations in the price of uranium?" 9 There are, I suggest, a lot of reasons, but risk aversion provides a convenient excuse for not bothering to look.' °
The recent paper by Jeffrey Perloff" provides a good example of
how risk aversion can lead one astray. Perloff asks whether it might ever
be desirable for a court to excuse a party from performing a contract
because of a price increase between the date of contract formation and
contract performance. He concludes that discharging the contract
might increase social welfare in certain circumstances.
His analysis focuses on a contract for the future delivery of a fungible commodity. The seller (a farmer) is assumed to be risk averse, while
the buyer is assumed to be risk neutral. The price at the delivery date is
uncertain as is the quantity that the farmer will actually produce. (As is
customary in economic modelling, the means of the distributions of
price and output are presumed to be known.) Social welfare in this
model depends only upon the variance of the seller's income since the
expected income cannot be influenced by the variables under the seller's
control. (Trust me.) The smaller the variance, the greater is the social
welfare. Perloff demonstrates that it is possible that discharging a contract because the price change exceeds a certain level could reduce the
variance in the seller's income, and therefore increase social welfare, if
the market price and the level of output were negatively correlated.
The model is clever and, I think, elegant. But does it really have
anything to do with the question? As Perloff notes, 2 analytically it does
not matter whether the price limits are imposed by the parties in their
initial contract or by the courts. But that leaves us with the obvious
question: if the parties cared about the matter, why would they leave it
to the courts to fill in the blank term? After a century or so of experience
with courts not discharging such contracts, one would expect to see
some evidence of a private response. It is hard to believe that this problem would be too costly for the private sector to handle (with standardized terms or mechanisms devised by trade associations), yet still be
solvable by courts.
8. While it is an easy explanation it quickly leads the analyst into some hard mathematics. My objection stems in part from the large increased costs of incorporating risk aversion into
the analysis given the miniscule benefits.
9. Joskow, Commercial Impossibility, the Uranium Market and the Westinghouse Case,
6 J. LEGAL STUDIES 119, 173 (1977).
10. In his recent study of long-term coal contracts, Joskow has focused on these other
reasons. See Joskow, supra note 5.
11. See Perloff, supra note 7.
12. Id. at 228.
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Moreover, Perlof focuses on forward contracts for homogeneous
commodities in thick markets. If the seller breaches, the buyer simply
buys elsewhere at the market price. These contracts are probably the
least interesting as far as price adjustment is concerned. Even in Germany, where courts "seem to assume that the rewriting of frustrated
contracts is so beneficial that hesitancy on their part is not needed," 13
courts will virtually never overturn a contract because of an increase in
the market price of a standardized commodity. 14
A. The Benefits of Price Adjustment

Business firms have ample incentives to include some form of price
adjustment mechanism in their contracts even if both parties are risk
neutral. Firms do not generally enter into multi-year contracts because
of their concern for the future course of prices. Rather, they enter into
the agreements to achieve the benefits of cooperation. Having entered
into such an agreement, the parties have to make some decision regarding the course of prices during the life of the agreement. That is, price
adjustment will probably be ancillary to the main purposes of the
agreement.
Price adjustment can be difficult and costly. Why then bother?
Why not simply establish a price or a schedule of prices for the duration
of the agreement? I will suggest four reasons that might lead business
firms to consider using some form of price adjustment. First, if the contract concerns a complex product that will be continuously redefined
during the life of the contract, a price adjustment mechanism can price
the "amendments" to the original agreement. Examples include costplus pricing of sophisticated defense hardware and complex construction projects.1 5 Second, to properly coordinate their behavior, the parties want correct price signals. If the price of an input were below the
market price (and if the buyer could not resell at a price greater than the
contract price) the buyer would have an incentive to use "too much" of
the input. Since this should be anticipated at the formation stage, the
costs of poor coordination are borne by both parties. This is a pure
"moral hazard" problem akin to an insured person consuming too
much health care because the post-insurance price is too low. 16
13. See FrustratedContracts: United States, supra note 3, at 23.
14. See FrustratedContracts:Germany, supra note 3, at 1079.
15. For an elaboration on this point, see Goldberg, Regulation and Administered Contracts, 7 BELL J. OF ECON. 426 (1976).
16. See Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 AM. ECON. R'v. 531
(1968).
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Two other reasons are, analytically at least, more interesting: reduction of pre-contract search and post-agreement jockeying. In both
these explanations, the success of price adjustment depends upon its
ability to reduce the variance of outcomes. The reduced variance is not,
however, valued directly. Rather, it enables the parties to curtail mutually harmful behavior, thereby increasing the value of the agreement to
both parties.
A contract establishes gains to be divided between the parties; a
fixed-price contract determines the distribution of these gains. The parties could attempt to increase their share of the gains before signing the
contract by improving their information on the future course of costs
and prices. The more they each spend on this search, the smaller the pie.
Ceterisparibus, the larger the variance of the outcomes, the more resources would be devoted to this effort. The parties, therefore, have an
incentive to incorporate into the initial agreement a device that would
discourage this wasteful searching. Price adjustment mechanisms can
do precisely that by reducing the value of the special information. This
argument applies even for standardized commodities sold in thick
markets.
If after the firms enter into a long-term agreement the contract
price fails to track changing market conditions, the loser will be reluctant to continue performance. It could breach and suffer the legal and
reputational consequences, but other, less severe, alternatives to willing
compliance exist. A buyer could, for example, insist upon strict compliance with quality standards. The aggrieved party could read the contract literally-"working to the rules" as in labor disputes or in centrally planned economies. This is a variation on the pure moral hazard
story. The incorrect price induces the aggrieved party to expend resources in attempting to renegotiate the terms of the agreement. The
costs can arise directly from the effort to renegotiate or indirectly
through strategic bargaining. That is, the loser might threaten to engage in,acts which impose costs upon the other party but do not constitute a legal breach. These costs are a result of the failure to coordinate
behavior in the face of changed circumstances. These costs would be
unimportant if the parties had easy access to market alternatives; ceteris
paribus,the more isolated from alternatives the contracting parties are,
the more significant are the potential losses from poor coordination.'
Again, to the extent that the parties can anticipate these problems at the
formation stage, the value of the exchange is reduced. If the probability
of wasteful behavior increases as the divergence between contract price
17. See Goetz & Scott, The Mitigation Principle:Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REv. 967 (1983).
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and the opportunity cost of the aggrieved party widens, price-adjustment rules which narrow the gap become increasingly attractive.
B. The Mechanics of Price Adjustment
The easiest way to adjust the price is to index. But what should the
parties be indexing? The overall price level? Input costs? Market price?
Ideally the parties would index the market price. The payoff from indexing, after all, is from the reduction in the divergence between the
contract price and the market price. However, practical exigencies usually lead parties to index other prices as proxies. Indeed, in a long-term
contract there often is no unique external market price. The implications of this fact will become clearer in the discussion of Alcoa v. Essex
below.
Cost changes will be a reasonably good proxy for changes in the
market price if demand does not fluctuate too much or if industry supply is very elastic. However, changes in input prices are not necessarily
the same as changes in input costs. If the relative prices of inputs
change, the firm has an incentive to alter factor proportions to take
advantage of the new price relationships. Also, if factor productivity
changes, the connection between input prices and1 8 costs deteriorates.
Nevertheless, indexing to input prices is common.
While indexing would be the easiest price adjustment mechanism
to implement, it has the obvious disadvantage of tracking changing
conditions imperfectly. The poorer the correlation between the index
and what it is supposed to be tracking, the less attractive it will be.
Another relatively simple mechanical rule is permitting one party to
solicit outside offers with the other party having the right of first refusal.
This allows better tracking of that party's opportunity cost, but it discourages making relation-specific investments. That is, the direct costs
of price adjustment would be low, but the indirect costs of discouraging
entering into a long-term relationship in the first place might be quite
high. Cost-plus pricing tracks cost changes more closely, but is more
subject to manipulation; it also gives the seller poorer incentives to control costs, and requires that the parties devote more resources to monitoring performance.
Negotiation is, of course, always an option. Even if the contract
explicitly utilizes one of the methods mentioned in the previous paragraph or unambiguously states that the contract is a fixed price agree18. See Goldberg & Erickson, The Economics of Long-Term Contracts:A Case Study of
Petroleum Coke (1984), (unpublished manuscript). One component of the contract price was indexed to input prices in Alcoa.
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ment, one party could propose that the price be renegotiated. The contract price, the clarity of the legal rule, and the costs of invoking the
legal rule provide the background against which the renegotiation
might take place.
Renegotiation allows use of accurate, current information in revising the contract; but reopening the contract could result in cost-generating strategic behavior, especially if one of the parties is vulnerable to
the threat of nonrenewal. Renegotiation is not a zero-sum affair with
one side's gains offset by the other's loss. In exchange for an increased
price, for example, a seller could offer a contract extension and the
prospect of not working to the letter of the contract. (A threat, after all,
is just a promise with the sign reversed.)
The contract could explicitly establish the conditions under which
renegotiation is to take place. It could require renegotiation at fixed
intervals or have it triggered by specific events (for example, a rise in a
price index of more than 20%). Gross inequity clauses call for renegotiation if the contract price is too far out of line, but typically do not spell
out the criteria for determining when a gross inequity exists. The parties
could agree to renegotiate in good faith and determine what would happen if the negotiations break down. The failure to negotiate a new price
could result in continued performance at the current price, termination,
mediation or arbitration, and so forth.
There are, in sum, a lot of mechanisms available for adjusting price
within a long-term contract. All are imperfect. Their relative costs and
benefits will determine which, if any, the parties should choose. 19
III. ALCOA V. EssEx
A. The Facts
In 1967, Alcoa and Essex entered into a twenty year agreement in
which Alcoa agreed to convert Essex's alumina into molten aluminum
at Alcoa's Warrick, Indiana plant.2" Essex purchased its alumina from
an Alcoa subsidiary under a second long-term contract. The trial judge
insisted that the two contracts were separate and that by design Alcoa's
left hand did not know what the right hand was doing.2 ' After conversion the molten aluminum would be loaded into crucibles owned by
Essex and taken by truck to Essex's nearby fabricating plant built specifically to receive it. The contract was for 50 million pounds per year
19.
their relative
20.
21.

For examples of different price adjustment mechanisms and the determinants of
efficacy see Goldberg & Erickson, supra note 18.
The facts in this section of the article are synthesized from the decision and the briefs.
I confess to being suspicious.
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and included options for three additional blocks of 25 million pounds
each. (By 1973, the parties had deleted the last two blocks.) Hence, the
contract quantity at the time the litigation arose was 75 million pounds
per year.
The initial contract price was 15 cents per pound, composed of a
"demand charge" of five cents per pound, 2 and a "production
charge". The latter included a fixed component of four cents per pound
(which was the "profit" on the plant constructed to fulfill this contract)
and three cents each for non-labor (primarily fuel) and labor costs. The
former was indexed by the Industrial Component of the Wholesale
Price Index and the latter by Alcoa's average hourly labor cost at the
Warrick plant. The contract included a ceiling price of 65% of the price
of a specified type of aluminum as reported in a trade journal; however,
it did not specify a minimum price.
The demand charge was to be paid regardless of whether Essex
took any aluminum. In effect, Essex "rented" a portion of Alcoa's Warrick plant at a fixed rate of $7.09 million per year ($4.09 million for the
demand charge and $3 million for the fixed charge) and paid a service
fee of six cents per pound that was indexed.
Problems arose following the large increase in fuel prices in 1973.
In the ensuing years the market price of aluminum and the cost of producing it in Warrick increased far more rapidly than did the contract
price. By 1979, Essex received aluminum from Alcoa under the contract
at 36 cents per pound and resold some of it in the open market at 73
cents. Non-labor production costs rose from 5.8 cents to 22.7 cents in
1973-78, while the wholesale price index less than doubled. Alcoa attempted to renegotiate the price as early as 1975. In 1978, the dispute
went to trial.
The trial court ruled in Alcoa's favor. Indexing non-labor production costs to the Wholesale Price Index was deemed a "mutual mistake"
because it tracked those costs so badly. The court also accepted Alcoa's
alternative theories of impracticability and frustration. The court reformed the contract, since rescission would result in a windfall for
Alcoa and deprive Essex of the benefits of its long-term supply contract.
The court rewrote the price term of the contract to include a minimum
price assuring Alcoa a one cent per pound "profit".
The disputed contract represented only a small part of the business
of Alcoa and Essex. Alcoa's sales and total assets in 1979 were each
22. Actually, this price was to be adjusted to cover increased construction costs at the
Warrick plant when new blocks of aluminum capacity were ordered. The price of the first block (50
million pounds) was 5.27 cents per pound and the price for the second block was 5.82 cents per
pound. These prices would remain constant for the life of the contract.
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almost $5 billion. 2" By the time of trial, Essex had been acquired by
United Technologies, another multi-billion dollar firm. Despite its
losses on this contract, Alcoa's overall profits in 1979 were around $500
million; its rate of return on equity in 1978 exceeded 14 percent for the
first time in 22 years. 24 This is not, clearly, a case in which a bad contract jeopardized the survival of a firm, as in Westinghouse. Rather, it is
more instructive to view this contract as a poor performer in the firm's
much larger portfolio of contracts, a portfolio which was performing
very well overall.
B. The $75 Million Misunderstanding
The court placed considerable emphasis on the fact that projected
losses from 1977 to 1987 were in the range of $75 million. This is one of
those funny numbers that means nothing, but could end up as a fundamental part of the Alcoa doctrine, were one to emerge. Alcoa was excused because they stood to lose $75 million; we won't excuse X because
it cannot prove that it will lose such a large amount. (As I will note
below, the Alcoa judge distinguished another case on precisely this
ground.) It is, therefore, useful to look at how the court determined the
magnitude of the loss.
The "profits" are the revenue minus the actual production costs
minus the demand charge (the 5 + cents per pound). The court assumed
something (the decision does not make it quite clear what) about future
costs and prices for the remaining life of the contract and then added
them up. There are three obvious problems with this. First, the future
profits are undiscounted. A dollar lost in 1984 is just as important as a
dollar lost in 1979. Second, the estimates are based on guesses about the
future course of prices; there is nothing wrong with guesses, but time
has a way of transforming guesses into facts. 2 5 But these are quibbles.
The most important point is that the estimate, even if done right, is
irrelevant.
What does Alcoa lose if it must fulfill the contract? It loses the
chance to sell the aluminum to someone else. That is the true measure
of the loss, and in this case it is considerably greater than the figure cited
by the judge. In the year the suit was brought the loss was over thirty
cents per pound, over $20 million. The original cost of construction of
the plant is a red herring equivalent to "par value" for a stock, a vestige
of the past with no economic content.

23. The Fortune Directory, FORTUNE, May 5, 1980, pp. 274, 276.
24. Aluminum's Bosses Are Beaming, FORBEs,Nov. 27, 1978, at 40.
25. In fact, aluminum prices fell sharply in the early 1980's. That price decline undoubtedly facilitated settlement of the dispute.
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The error is important. In an earlier case, 2 6 the court refused to
allow Gulf Oil to escape its obligation to deliver jet fuel under a fiveyear contract despite the fact that the price index utilized had inadequately tracked the course of oil prices. The court held that the cost
data presented were insufficient to ascertain how much it cost Gulf to
produce a gallon of jet fuel, and, therefore, Gulf had failed to prove that
it had suffered losses on the contract. The Alcoa judge applied the "negative accounting profit" test in distinguishing this decision from Alcoa.
When faced with a claim of changed circumstances, courts or arbitrators should not look to accounting cost data to determine the merits
of the claim. The relevant question is whether the difference between the
contract price and the aggrieved party's next best option is large enough
to warrant relief. An accounting cost or profit standard is an invitation
to produce a lot of information with a low expected value.
C. Alcoa's Mistake
In retrospect, of course, Alcoa made a big mistake. However, the
mistake singled out by the court to justify reformation of the contract
was not the most important one. The failure of the price index to accurately measure the change in fuel prices accounted for only about ten to
twelve cents of the difference between the contract price and the market
price for aluminum in 1979 (that difference being over 30 cents).2 7 The
main problem was that the contract did not track changing demand
conditions and the demand for aluminum was soaring in the late
1970's.28

Moreover, the contract was not designed to adjust to large changes
in the overall price level. Sixty percent of the initial contract price (the
demand charge plus the fixed "profit") was unadjusted for the life of the
contract. A very simple example gives an indication of the type of problem this could cause. Suppose that the price level rises about 7% per
year (doubling roughly every ten years); assume that the factors of production remain equally productive and that they continue to be used in
the same proportions. 29 The indexed production costs would then rise
from six cents per pound to 24 cents per pound in the twentieth year.
However, the remaining costs are unindexed, so the final contract price

26. Eastern Air Lines v. Gulf Oil Corp, 415 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
27. Since some of the data were confidential, it is necessary to use rough approximations.
For my purposes that causes no difficulties.
28. See Aluminum Wastes No Time Raising Prices, Bus. WK., Oct. 15, 1979, at 36;
Shortage In Aluminum, Bus. WK., Sept. 25, 1978, at 115, 117-18; Aluminum's Bosses Are Beaming,
FoRBEs, Nov. 27, 1978, at 40; Aluminum Makers Exult, Timi, April 3, 1978, at 55.
29. The assumption of unchanged productivity is a strong one since it implies that real
wages cannot grow.
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would rise only to (24 + 9 =) 33 cents. To keep the real price of aluminum constant the contract price would have had to increase to 60 cents.
The relevant question is not whether Alcoa made what turned out
to be a bad decision. They did. But was it a bad decision at the time they
made it? The answer to that is less certain. When I began this project it
seemed clear that Alcoa could have, and should have, done better. At a
minimum, I thought, they should have indexed the remaining 60% of
the costs. However, a more careful look leads me to believe that it is a
much closer question.3
This long-term contract is in many respects similar to a lease or
sale of part of Alcoa's Warrick production capacity to Essex. A fixed
rental for long-term leases is not uncommon. Moreover, if one firm sells
a durable asset to another, it is the rule rather than the exception, that
the price is not to be readjusted after the sale has taken place. It can be
argued, then, by analogy, that this component of the long-term contract that looks so much like a lease should also be at a fixed price.
If the contract price of a long-lived asset were to be readjusted to
better track the market price, the parties would expend less resources
today in pursuit of special information. If this benefit were great, we
would expect the parties to incorporate price adjustment arrangements
in their sales and leases of assets. However, the benefits will often be
very small. Information regarding the future price level, for example, is
already incorporated in the term structure of interest rates. It is not
necessarily accurateinformation, ex post; however, the key question is
whether it is improvable information, ex ante. Incorporating a general
price index, therefore, need not result in reduced information costs.
The lease/sale analogy, however, has difficulties. A pure lease or
sale is similar to a contract for a standardized commodity because further coordination between the two parties is unnecessary; the only issue
is whether price adjustment reduces the initial price search. However,
the more the outcomes depend upon future coordination by the parties,
the less likely they will use a fixed price contract."1 For example, shopping center leases in which the lessor engages in activities which generate business for the tenants will base at least part of the compensation
on a percentage of the gross (which automatically provides for some
30. The question of whether Alcoa had made a mistake is unrelated to the court's finding
of mutual mistake. I am only trying to determine whether the price adjustment mechanism in this
contract was a reasonable one under the circumstances.
31. This discussion is highly speculative since I am only dimly aware of the adjustment
mechanisms actually used in long-term leases. I should note that a common device is to use shortterm agreements with fixed prices so that the price can be renegotiated on a regular basis. Such
arrangements might also include an expectation, legal or otherwise, of renewal on reasonable
terms.
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price adjustment). If Alcoa were leasing the plant to-Essex and allowing
Essex to operate it, the fixed price arrangement would be routine. The
fact that operation of the plant was in Alcoa's hands reduced the likelihood that a fixed price would be successful. The increased divergence
between the contract price and Alcoa's best alternative would induce
Alcoa to engage in strategic behavior, thereby reducing the value of the

contract to both parties.
However, it is unlikely that indexing capital costs would result in a
more accurate contract price. I would speculate that the pre-1973 experience would confirm that indexing this cost component to the general
price level, construction costs, or any other conceivable cost-based
measure would have resulted in a poorer fit between the market and
contract price. 3 2

Instead of using a cost-based price adjustment, the parties could
have attempted to track market conditions by, for example, indexing to
a particular aluminum price. 3 3 Using output prices to index is not with-

out problems. First, other goods with published prices that are sufficiently close to the output that we are attempting to index might not
exist. Second, the observable external prices are typically list prices, not
transaction prices. If these diverge, the index suffers. It is plausible that

the two would diverge in a concentrated industry like aluminum since
list prices typically change more slowly in such industries.3 4 Further, if
the contract price were linked to the list price of a type of Alcoa's aluminum, then Alcoa would have an incentive, however modest, to set the

list price in excess of the transaction price.
Even if list prices were accurate measures of transaction prices, a

more fundamental difficulty remains. The parties do not necessarily
confront the same external price. That is, the relevant price to each
32. Note that this is a different argument than the one accepted by the court. It emphasized how closely the wholesale price index had tracked one component of costs in the pre-contract
period. I am claiming that there did not exist an index that would have closely tracked another,
and larger, component of costs.
33. Note that in the previous paragraph I treated the capital cost as a historical cost.
Alternatively, we could adjust to reflect the value of the fixed plant as it changes during the life of
the structure. Thus, the cost of using the plant to fill this contract must include the opportunity
cost of using the plant for other purposes (namely supplying aluminum to someone else). If the
capital had a wide variety of other uses (for example, retail space or small vans), such an adjustment might be sensible. If, however, the capital was highly idiosyncratic, as in this case, its value
would closely track changing market conditions. If these could be indexed accurately it would
almost surely be unproductive to index the market value of capital either instead of or in addition
to the market price of the output.
34. For example, in 1979 Business Week reported list prices for ingot of 66 cents per
pound while the spot price was 75 cents. This is a bit misleading, however, because of the existence
of price controls at the time. Aluminum Wastes No Time Raising Prices, Bus. WK., Oct. 15, 1979,
at 36.
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party is its opportunity cost-the net price it could get from the next
best trading partner. In a market for a standardized commodity, the list
price and these two opportunity costs would be roughly the same. However, in a long-term contract in which the parties deliberately isolate
themselves from the external market, these three prices are more likely
to diverge. Generally, the more isolated the contracting parties are from
market alternatives, the poorer the relationship between these three
prices is likely to be. Thus, while the parties might desire to index their
agreement to a published market price, the very nature of a long-term
contract makes it likely that the index price would not perform its function adequately. It is, therefore, not at all obvious that indexing the
contract to changes in the published price of a particular type of output
would be in the interest of the two parties.
In the instant case, Alcoa's opportunity cost is the net price it
could receive by using the Warrick capacity to produce ingot for export
to other customers. Essex's opportunity cost is the price of delivered
aluminum ingot. There is no a priori reason to believe that these will be
close to each other. However, for an index to work it is not necessary
that the prices be close, only that they move together over time.
Whether these two opportunity costs (and the market price for aluminum ingot) move together over time is an empirical question which I
intend to explore in a later paper.
Essex chose to incorporate the output price information in the
form of a maximum price. Alcoa, however, was not willing to pay (by
agreeing to a lower initial contract price) for a price minimum. The
failure to do so might well have been a mistake ex ante, but it is at least
plausible that a ceiling indexed to published prices would be more valuable to Essex than a similarly indexed floor would have been to Alcoa.
Alcoa's superior knowledge of the aluminum industry might make
Essex suspicious of the manner in which costs were indexed. A bias in
favor of Alcoa, because of Alcoa's superior knowledge, would make a
bound on the index relatively more valuable to Essex.
Conceivably, therefore, Alcoa's failure to index plant costs or include a minimum price was not an error ex ante. Looking at the new
contract may provide some insight on this issue. We know that the parties rejected the judicially imposed minimum price based on ex ante
accounting costs."a But we do not know whether that was a reason for

rejection and we do not know what replaced it. I would speculate that
the new contract includes a minimum and that the minimum depends
upon output prices. If so, that would suggest that Alcoa had erred
initially.
35.

See FrustratedContracts: United States, supra note 3.
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IV. RESOLUTION OF PRICE ADJUSTMENT DISPUTES

Suppose that contracting parties assign the task of resolving price
adjustment disputes to an outsider (a court or an arbitrator). The outsider can be asked to resolve two very different questions: (a) have conditions changed sufficiently to justify relief; and (b) what form should
relief take-what will the new price (or price formula) be? Since the
parties bear the costs of producing the evidence, they must reckon the
expected costs of producing evidence on production costs, accounting
profits, market prices, opportunity costs, and so forth, and weigh these
against the expected benefits (in terms of reducing the costs arising from
the divergence of contract price from market price). These evidentiary
costs provide the backdrop for subsequent renegotiation. Thus, for example, if a standard required that one party spend a lot to produce
evidence to forestall price revision, its opposite party could use those
potential costs as a bargaining chip in renegotiation.
For determining whether relief is justified, accounting cost data of
the sort relied upon by the Alcoa judge are largely beside the point. The
relevant question is whether the difference between the contract price
and the aggrieved party's next best option is large enough to warrant
relief. The requisite price differential would vary across contracts.
There is no "magic number": if price goes up by at least X% or losses
total at least $ Y, adjust the price. A large divergence between the market and contract price for a standardized commodity, for example,
would have little adverse effect on the expected value of a contract; it
would, therefore, be unlikely that the parties would benefit from revision. Conversely, if a modest price divergence would generate considerable joint costs, revision could be effective. The problem is complicated
by the fact that making relief easy to obtain generates additional joint
costs as well. Rational parties might easily find that the potential benefits from price revision come at too high a cost.
This is especially true if there is no obvious standard for determining a new contract price. My initial presumption was that if a reasonable measure of the output price were available, the parties would want
the arbitrator to use this to guide his decision. Further consideration
has led me to conclude that this might not be very helpful. A simple
example illustrates the problem. Suppose that when the contract was
written Alcoa would have received 10 cents a pound for its aluminum
on the open market, Essex would have paid 20 cents per pound, and the
contract price was fifteen cents. When the case is litigated, Alcoa could
sell at 50 cents and Essex buy at 70, and the contract price is 35 cents.
What should the contract price be? Even if this information were
costlessly produced and absolutely accurate, are the parties better off
putting the decision in the hands of an arbitrator? What decision rule
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would they want him to apply? When the opportunity costs of the buyer
and seller diverge, it is not at all clear what should guide the arbitrator
in setting a new price. Thus, the possible divergence not only impairs
the value of a published price as an index, but makes it more difficult for
the parties to rely upon outsiders (arbitrators and judges) to revise the
price.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The foregoing provides a framework for analyzing price adjustment in long-term contracts. The analysis downplays risk aversion and
instead emphasizes controlling the joint costs arising from the divergence of contract price from the opportunity costs of the parties.
If a unique, easily observable market price existed, the adjustment
problem would not be difficult. However, the conditions that make entering into a long-term contract desirable in the first instance make it
unlikely that such prices exist. This is obviously true for such things as
complex defense hardware and construction of state-of-the-art chemical plants. But it is even a problem in a relatively simple case like Alcoa
v. Essex where the contract calls for a product (molten aluminum) that
appears closely related to an easily observable market price. The problem is that by entering into the long-term contract at least one of the
parties deliberately isolated itself from the external market. The relationship between the external price and the opportunity costs of the
parties need not be very close.
This argument is, I confess, ex post rationalization. I had originally thought that it was definitely in Alcoa's interest to index the contract to a published aluminum ingot price or at least to include an indexed floor. It had not occurred to me that the opportunity cost and
market prices should diverge and that this divergence would have an
adverse effect on the value of an index based on output price. The empirical question, which I hope to shed some light upon in a subsequent
paper, is the extent of the divergence.
I have deliberately avoided the questions of whether the court was
right to revise this contract or, more generally, under what conditions
(if any) courts should excuse or reform contracts because of one party's
dissatisfaction with the price. I have done so for three reasons. First,
any conclusion would be premature-there has been very little analysis
of why and how business firms deal with price adjustment problems.
Second, I believe that we will make more progress in understanding the
economics of contracts if we do not insist upon drawing policy conclusions; in any event, the principle of division of labor suggests that I
leave this task to the lawyers. Third, providing an indication of the rela-

1985:527

Price Adjustments in Long- Term Contracts

tive importance of various factors is more important than putting forth
a conclusion embodying an implicit weighting.
For example, in contracts for future delivery of commodities
traded in thick markets, parties can rarely impose costs upon each other
and the ex ante demand for price adjustment will be low. The parties
probably would not choose to include price adjustment mechanisms in
their contract; nor would they permit the disadvantaged party to call
upon the courts for relief. The more isolated the exchange is from the
market, the more likely it is that the parties would find price adjustment
efficacious. However, the reasons that make adjustment desirable make
it hard to achieve. The case for intervention, if the contract does not
explicitly provide for it, is stronger when the costs of a price dispute are
high and the costs of settlement would be reduced by giving the disadvantaged party the right to call upon the court to revise the contract,
despite the contract's silence. It might well turn out that this is a null set.
But even so, the intellectual apparatus will be applicable in cases in
which the parties explicitly provide for price revision by outsiders.

